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We analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contrib-
ute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team 
members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong 
player. 
Keywords: Experiments, Leadership, Reciprocity, Voluntary Contribution Mechanism 
JEL: C91, C92, H40, H41 
                                        
†   We thank Michael Kurschilgen for useful comments. 2 
1.    Introduction 
Suppose several academics are working together on a research project. Usually, providing input 
to the joint project much resembles contributing to a public good, and therefore reciprocity and 
conditional cooperation may affect the team members. But now assume that for a certain team 
member, working on the project pays privately. For example, this researcher might have to ac-
complish a task required for the project (say, gathering data or acquiring knowledge about a new 
research method) for some closely related and profitable consultancy work anyway. How will 
the collaborators on the project respond to the work input of this team member? Will they regard 
it as an example to follow or rather neglect any reciprocity motive because of the private profit-
ability of the work? 
We analyse this situation by introducing a public-goods experiment where one player has a 
higher marginal per-capita rate of return (MPCR) from the public good than the others. In our 
baseline treatment, one player (a “super-additive” player) has an MPCR larger than one, i.e., she 
has a net benefit from contributing to the public good.
1 In a control treatment, the distinguished 
player has a high per-capita rate but smaller than one, such that contributions are relatively cheap 
for this player but still constitute a sacrifice.  
Our data show that the presence of a strong player with an MPCR smaller than one has a positive 
impact on the contributions of the other players. However, if the strong player has an MPCR lar-
ger than one, the other group members contribute less than in the comparison treatment, although 
the distinguished player contributes almost her entire endowment.  
The results contribute to the literature on conditional cooperation and reciprocity. There is sub-
stantial evidence that subjects are conditional cooperators, i.e., they cooperate only if other play-
ers of the group do the same (Fischbacher et al. 2001). This robust finding has initiated public-
goods experiments in which group members choose sequentially. Some player becomes the first 
mover – either voluntarily or exogenously imposed – who can give a positive example to the 
other group members (Clarke and Sefton 2001; Gächter and Renner 2007; Potters et al. 2005, 
2007; Güth et al. 2007; Levati et al., forthcoming). These studies find that participants indeed 
reciprocate to first movers who provide an example. Our results show that a leader's sacrifice 
(Choi, Mai-Dalton 1998; De Cremer, van Knippenberg 2005) considerably supports the emer-
gence of this behaviour.  
                                        
1    Zelmer (2003) reviews linear public-goods games with asymmetric marginal per capita rates of return, none 
of which involves players with a rate larger than one. 3 
2. The  Experiment 
2.1   Experimental Design  
In our experiment, subjects participate in 2x10 periods of a typical linear public-goods game in 
constant groups of four players with a surprise restart
2 after period 10. Each group consists of 
one player of type A and three players of type B. The subjects' types are randomly determined at 
the beginning and kept constant throughout the experiment. Players interact anonymously, but 
player types are common knowledge. 
Players receive an endowment of 20 tokens per period and simultaneously decide how to share 
this endowment between their private and a joint group account. Subsequently, they are informed 
about the individual contributions of each player in the group and their own payoff. Players re-
ceive 1 point for each token they put in their private account. Additionally, all players in the 
group earn points for each token that is put in the group account either by themselves or by any 
other player. Players of type B receive 0.4 points per group account token. The MPCR for play-
ers of type A differs across treatments: In our main treatment [T 1.4] their MPCR equals 1.4, 
whereas it is 0.9 in our control treatment [T 0.9]. Consequently, player i´s individual period pay-
off, πi, equals 
, ) . . ( ∑ + + − =
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where ei denotes player i’s endowment, gi player i’s contribution to the joint group account, and 
δi equals 1 if player i is of type A in [T 0.9], δi equals 2 if player i is of type A in the [T 1.4], and 
0 otherwise. The computerised experiments
3 were conducted at the EconLab at the University of 
Bonn in December 2007. We ran 4 sessions with a total of 21 matching groups (84 subjects), 
leaving us with 10 independent observations in treatment [T 0.9] and 11 independent observa-
tions in treatment [T 1.4]. At the beginning of each session, instructions were distributed and 
read out aloud.
4 Afterwards, participants could pose clarifying questions in private and had to 
answer a set of control questions to ensure that everybody had understood the game. A session 
lasted for about 45 minutes. Points earned were accumulated over all periods and converted at an 
exchange rate of 1 Euro per 85 points. Subjects earned on average 10.93 Euro (standard devia-
tion 1.78 Euro) including a show-up fee of 4 Euro. 
                                        
2    The restart was announced only at the end of the first ten periods, and group composition and players' types 
were kept constant across all periods (see Andreoni 1988 or Croson 1996 for similar restart-designs). 
3    Subjects were recruited with the online recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner 2004), and the experimental soft-
ware was developed with the zTree software package (Fischbacher 2007). 
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2.2 Behavioural  Predictions 
In our control treatment [T 0.9], zero contributions are the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilib-
rium in each stage game of the finitely repeated linear public-goods game, if one assumes play-
ers who are rational and only interested in their own monetary payoff. Also players of type B in 
treatment [T 1.4] contribute nothing in the Nash equilibrium. Due to the MPCR being greater 
than one, A-players in [T 1.4] have a dominant strategy to contribute their entire endowment to 
the public good. Thus, under standard assumptions, we should expect to observe a treatment ef-
fect only in the decision of A-players. 
Once we move away from the standard assumptions and introduce, e.g., reciprocity or condi-
tional cooperation, B-players' behaviour might also be affected by the treatment manipulation. 
The high contributions of the super-additive player A in [T 1.4] could possibly motivate them to 
cooperate and contribute a substantial amount, too. However, if it is not A's contribution per se 
that matters, but rather the assumed underlying motivation, the incentive structure in [T 1.4] 
might hamper conditional cooperation – simply because high contributions of player A cannot be 
identified as being a clearly cooperative action. As a consequence, B-players might then be un-
sure about whether to reciprocate or not. 
2.3 Results 
Figure 1 illustrates the average contributions in both treatments and for both types of players. 
Figure 1: Mean contributions by periods 
 
  5 
The effect of increasing the MPCR of player A is strong and significant. When their MPCR 
equals 1.4 instead of 0.9, they contribute on average about 50% (40%) more in the first (second) 
phase of the experiment (rank sum test, p = 0.02 and p = 0.01, one-sided). The difference re-
mains stable and significant over time (cp. Table 1).  
By contrast, the contributions of players B are much higher in the absence of a super-additive 
player. Compared to treatment [T 1.4], players B contribute approximately 34% (93%) more to 
the public good in the first (second) phase of treatment [T 0.9]. Except for the beginning, this 
difference reaches significance over time (e.g., p < 0.05, rank sum test on periods 11-20, cp. Ta-
ble 1). 
Table 1: Contributions by periods 
 
  Period 1  1-5 6-10 10 1-10 
Type A 0.9  12.8  12.4  8.5  5.2  10.4 
Type A 1.4  15.2  16.0  15.5  16.2  15.7 
Prob>|z|
  0.66 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.02 
  11 11-15  16-20 20 11-20 
Type A 0.9  13.6  12.3  9.6  5.2  11.0 
Type A 1.4  15.8  17.5  18.3  19.1  17.9 
Prob>|z|  0.43 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  1  1-5 6-10 10 1-10 
Type  B  0.9  8.7 7.7 4.2 4.1 5.9 
Type  B  1.4  7.9 6.1 2.6 1.5 4.4 
Prob>|z|  0.39 0.25 0.09 0.09 0.26 
  11 11-15  16-20 20 11-20 
Type  B  0.9  7.6 7.6 3.5 2.3 5.6 
Type  B  1.4  4.9 4.1 1.9 1.2 2.9 
Prob>|z|  0.22 0.13 0.08 0.28 0.05 
 
Note: The table reports average contribution to the public good for treatment [T 0.9] and [T 1.4] (first two 
rows). The third row reports p-values (two-sided) from a nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test  
 
The tendency of higher contributions from B-players in [T 0.9] is despite the fact that players A 
contribute more in [T 1.4] than in [T 0.9]. Our data thus suggest that the unambiguousness of A's 
motivation to contribute is an important factor for conditional cooperation. This can also be seen 
by calculating a Spearman correlation coefficient between B-players’ average contributions and 
player A's contribution in the previous period as a descriptive measure for each independent ob-
servation separately, and then comparing the coefficients between treatments.
5 This descriptive 
measure of the reaction of B-players’ contributions on the behaviour of A on average equals 0.18 
in [T 0.9] and –0.07 in [T 1.4], the difference being significant (rank sum test, p = 0.04, two-
sided). Correspondingly, after the A-player has contributed more than zero in the previous period 
                                        
5    Three matching groups in 1.4 are excluded, because their players A always contributed their entire endow-
ment, resulting in too many ties to calculate a correlation coefficient. 6 
the mean contribution of B-players is 6.1 in treatment [T 0.9], but only 3.7 in treatment [T 1.4]. 
In both treatments, B-players' contributions are more in line with the average contributions of the 
other B-players in the previous period (the average Spearman correlation coefficient is 0.27 in 
both treatments). 
In treatment [T 0.9] we observe a typical restart effect, i.e., contribution levels in periods 1 and 
11 are virtually the same. This is true for both player types. Yet, in treatment [T 1.4] – although 
A-players’ contributions are relatively stable during the first 10 periods – players B exhibit a less 
cooperative attitude: in the second phase they start at a lower level than in the first phase (signed 
rank test, p = 0.07, two-tailed, on average 7.94 in period 1 and 4.88 in period 11). 
Total contributions to the joint group account do not differ between treatments (rank sum test, 
p = 0.95 for the first ten periods, on average 28.2 in [T 0.9] and 28.8 in [T 1.4] and p = 0.48 for 
the last ten periods, 27.6 in [T 0.9] and 26.8 in [T 1.4], both two-sided). Thus, the higher contri-
butions of players A in [T 1.4] – due to the higher MPCR – are compensated by higher contribu-
tions of players B in [T 0.9]. Note that this ultimately depends on our parameterisation and 
would probably change if the number of B-players in the group were increased.  
3.   Conclusion 
Our results refine the previous evidence on conditional cooperation in public-goods environ-
ments and show that others follow a high contributing player to a larger extent if they know that 
her example requires a sacrifice. However, if contributing can be attributed to a different motive, 
for example, individual payoff maximisation, others feel less inclined to follow the example. In 
this respect our findings underline the importance of intentions for cooperation (Blount 1995, 
Charness 2004, Falk et al., forthcoming) in public-goods environments also, confirming the in-
tuition that a sacrifice provides an encouraging signal to followers (Hermalin 1998). Thus, a 
team member who has a personal motive to contribute, e.g., because it privately pays off for her 
to do so, might be well advised to disguise this fact and present her contributions as costly and 
truly cooperative choices in order to foster group cooperation.  
 7 
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Instructions for the experiment 
(Treatment variations are indicated with {  } ) 
General introductory information 
•  Each participant is endowed with a starting capital of 340 points credited on his private account independent 
from the behaviour in the experiment. 
•  The experiment consists of two parts. In the following the course of action of the first part is explained. The 
instructions of the second part will be handed out later. 
 
Part 1 
Course of action 
•  During part 1, you belong to a group consisting of 4 participants. The identity of the other participants re-
mains unknown to you. The composition of the group does not change. During part 1 of the experiment you will 
exclusively interact with the participants in your group. 
•  In each group there are two roles: one type A player and three type B players. The roles will be randomly 
awarded at the beginning and do not change. 
•  Part 1 consists of 10 periods. 
 





Contribution to the common project 
In each period each group member receives an endowment of 20 points. You have to decide how many of the 20 
points you want to contribute to a common project. You can keep the remaining points. 
Calculation of the payoff of a type A player in one period 
In a period your payoff consists of two components: 
•  tokens you keep = endowment – your contribution to the project 
•  earnings from the project = 1.4 {0.9} x sum of the contributions of all group members 
Thus, if you are a type A player, your payoff is: 
20 – your contribution to the project 
     + 1.4 {0.9} x sum of the contributions of all group members 
 
Calculation of the payoff of a type B player in one period 
In a period your payoff consists of two components: 
•  tokens you keep = endowment – your contribution to the project 
•  earnings from the project = 0.4 x sum of the contributions of all group members 
Thus, if you are a type B player, your payoff is: 
20 – your contribution to the project 
     + 0.4 x sum of the contributions of all group members 10 
Information at the end of a period 
At the end of a period you will receive an overview of the contributions of each player in the current period. 
Total payoff 
The total payoff from the experiment is composed of the starting capital of 340 points plus the sum of payoffs from 
all 10 periods. At the end of the experiment your total payoff will be paid out to you, with an exchange rate of 1 € 
per 85 tokens. 
Please notice 
Communication is not allowed during the whole experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. All 
decisions are made anonymously, i.e., no other participant is informed about the identity of someone who made a 




Groups and roles 
•  You belong to the same group as in part 1. Also, during part 2 of the experiment you will exclusively interact 
with the participants in your group. 
•  You have the same role as in part 1. 
Periods and course of action in a period 
•  Part 2 also consists of 10 periods. 
•  In each period in part 2 you also have to decide about your contribution to the common project. 
•  The calculations of payoffs and the information at the end of a period are also the same as in part 1 of the ex-
periment. 
•  The payoff of a period is again added to your total payoff. 
 
 
Table: Average contributions by group and periods 
  Period 1-10  11-20 
  Type  A 0.9  A 1.4  B 0.9  B 1.4  A 0.9  A 1.4  B 0.9  B 1.4 
1 9  18  7.3  7.6  9.6  19  5.6  7.3  Group  
2 13.3  12.1  3.6  5.6  12.4  14.7  4.1  2.3 
 3 7  20  7.3  8.9  9.6  20  8.7  1.6 
 4  11.8  20  10.5  9.7  8.5  20  4.7  6.3 
 5  16  7.7  5.2  0.4  8  15.6  2.7  0.1 
 6  14.7  16.9  3.4  2.8  18  19.9  7.8  3.9 
 7  4.5  17.9  8.3  2.6  3.1  19.4  4.4  0.1 
 8  17.2  5.1  6.4  3.8  18.8  8.9  2.9  3.6 
 9  10.9  19.3  2.8  0.6  14.4  19.7  3.9  0 
 10 0 20  4.4  4.6  7.2  20  10.6  7.4 
 11   16    1.4   16    0.1 
 
 